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FAR, BUT NOT FAR ENOUGH: AN IDEALIST CRITIQUE 
OF THE RACIAL EQUALITY DIRECTIVE
Tena ©imonoviÊ Einwalter*
Summary: Racial discrimination in theory, but also in the reality of 
today’s Europe, is a multifaceted problem. There are no clear bound-
aries between the personal and social attributes of ‘race’, ethnicity, 
religion, culture, nationality or national origin. Is the Racial Equality 
Directive, as  the key legislative tool for combating racial or ethnic 
discrimination in EC law, wide enough or does it go far enough to 
successfully address different aspects of contemporary racism? The 
Directive prohibits discrimination on the ground of ‘racial or ethnic ori-
gin’, but no defi nition is given of the meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’, 
while nationality as a ground of discrimination is expressly excluded 
from its scope, and religion is covered by a different directive. Ad-
ditionally, the concept of equality underlying the Directive is situated 
between equality of treatment and a more substantive view of equal-
ity, with its remedial model mostly based on the ‘individual justice 
model’ and with the limits of positive action to be allowed under the 
Directive still unknown. Throughout the paper, an attempt is made to 
put forward some proposals to revise and update the Directive and to 
propose some guidelines to interpret the current text in order to set the 
common minimum at least slightly higher.
‘Those of us who subscribe to the vision of a pluralistic culture of 




For a long time, EC law addressed discrimination only on the grounds 
of sex and Member State nationality. In 1997, with the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the Council was given power to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination on the ground of sex, as well as on fi ve new grounds: 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual ori-
entation. In 2000, two directives that address these new grounds were 
enacted: Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
*  Tena ©imonoviÊ Einwalter, MJur (Oxon), Legal Advisor to the Croatian Ombudsman.
1  B Hepple, ‘Race and Law in Fortress Europe’ (2004) 67 (1) MLR 1-15, 2.
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ethnic origin,2 and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.3 
Regrettably, not all the new grounds have been treated equally. Di-
rective 2000/43/EC on race and ethnic origin has a much wider material 
scope than Directive 2000/78/EC on religion or belief, disability, age 
and sexual orientation.4 The discrepancy in the material scope of the two 
directives creates a hierarchy of grounds within EC law, thereby sending 
a message that some grounds are more important than others. This lack 
of a coherent approach to equality for all the six discrimination grounds 
is currently considered one of the principal insuffi ciencies of EC Anti-
discrimination law.5 
While strongly endorsing a coherent approach to equality across all 
the grounds, this article posits the view that at the same time all the 
grounds are different, to the extent that specifi c issues surround each of 
the grounds. To use the slogan of the Council of Europe youth campaign 
against racism, discrimination grounds are, or should be, ‘all different, 
all equal’.6 With this in mind and without being able to give a critique of 
the whole EC equality framework in a single article, this paper will look 
specifi cally at the ground of racial or ethnic origin, focusing on the Racial 
Equality Directive as the key legislative tool for combating  racial and 
ethnic discrimination in EC law. 
Even though racial or ethnic origin currently sits at the top of the 
hierarchy of new grounds,7 and even though both the Directive’s wide 
material scope and some of its provisions make it rather progressive, it 
will be argued that there is some room for clarifi cation and improvement. 
Focusing on questions related to racial or ethnic origin as a ground of 
2  Hereinafter Directive 2000/43/EC, Racial Equality Directive or Directive.
3  Hereinafter Directive 2000/78/EC.
4  In addition, only the Racial Equality Directive requires the establishment of an equality 
body, while there is no requirement to establish a body for the promotion of equal treatment 
of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation.
5  The most urgent legislative development needed to ensure a comprehensive approach 
would be the enactment of a new equal treatment directive that covers religion or belief, dis-
ability, age and sexual orientation in all the areas covered by the Racial Equality Directive. 
See Equinet (European network of equality bodies) Opinion of January 2008, Beyond the 
Labour Market New Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Discrimination, European Commis-
sion proposals for new initiatives designed to prevent and combat discrimination outside 
the labour market based on gender, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation.
6  Council of Europe, ECRI, All Different All Equal: Education Pack – Ideas, Tools and Re-
sources for Intercultural Education (European Youth Centre, 1995).
7  For a detailed account of the hierarchy, including the position of sex/gender in it, see 
E Holzleither ‘Mainstreaming Equality: Dis/Entangling Grounds of Discrimination’ (2005) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 927.
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discrimination, this article will argue that although the Directive goes far, 
it does not go far enough. 
Firstly, the question why it took racial discrimination so long to en-
ter EC law is explored and the possible purposes of the Racial Equality 
Directive are examined, also briefl y sketching the main features of the 
Directive. The central part of the paper identifi es some limitations of the 
Directive, particularly addressing the unclear meaning of ‘racial or ethnic 
origin’ as a ground of discrimination. The relationship with discrimina-
tion grounds related to ‘race’, but not explicitly included in the Directive, 
is discussed, as well as the relationship with religion, which is covered by 
the Employment Equality Directive. The paper further examines minority 
protection in the context of the Racial Equality Directive and the effective-
ness of the Directive in dealing with discrimination against Roma. It also 
examines the exclusion of nationality discrimination from the Directive’s 
scope. After considering the question of limits of positive action under the 
Directive, some conclusions are made about the view of equality underly-
ing the Directive and the enforcement and remedial structure, question-
ing the effectiveness of the adopted model. Throughout the paper, an 
attempt is made to put forward some (idealistic) proposals to revise and 
update the Directive and (more realistically) to propose some guidelines 
to interpret the current text.
II. Belated entry of racial discrimination in EC law, the Directive’s 
purpose and main features
2.1. Belated entry of racial discrimination in EC law
Since the Second World War, racial discrimination has consistently 
been prohibited in international treaties,8 regional instruments on hu-
man rights protection and general state practice, thereby becoming con-
trary to customary international law.9 At the EU level, racial discrimina-
tion entered EC law only in 1997, or more precisely in 1999, while bind-
ing legislation was adopted in the year 2000. However, sex discrimination 
has been present in EC law since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 through the right to equal pay.10 It really came into focus in the mid 
1970s11 and has since become the subject of a number of directives and 
8  Most notably in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and in the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).
9  M N Shaw, International Law (5th edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 266.
10  Original Article 119 of the EEC Treaty contained the provision prohibiting unequal pay 
for women and men.  
11  Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR 455 stating that the right to equal pay was 
directly effective.
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a rich jurisprudence, becoming the backbone of the EU’s social policy.12 
So, why has sex discrimination, but not for instance racial or ethnic dis-
crimination, been in the Community’s legislative focus for 25 years?13 
One part of the answer might be that the fi ght against racial discrim-
ination was perceived to be a human rights issue, and so better and more 
effi ciently dealt with in the framework of the Council of Europe. However, 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms14 and the efforts of the European Court of Human 
Rights were not particularly effective in the fi eld of racial discrimination. 
The European Court of Human Rights has been rather conservative in 
ruling on racial discrimination,15 fi nding the fi rst violation of the principle 
of prohibition of racial discrimination only in July 2005.16 The situation 
has only recently begun to change with the case law on racial discrimina-
tion now rapidly growing, particularly regarding Roma and Travellers.17 
It seems that there is already cross-fertilisation in this fi eld, with the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights being infl uenced by the Racial Equality 
Directive.18 Aside from the growing case law, a grand new development in 
the anti-discrimination fi eld at the Council of Europe is the adoption of 
Protocol 12, a free standing equality guarantee.19 
12 C Barnard, EC Employment Law (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 298.
13  This post festum examination of why it took race discrimination so long to enter EC law 
as compared to sex discrimination is undertaken without the intention of playing grounds 
and groups against each other or claiming sex discrimination entered EC law too early, but 
on the contrary, that it took racial discrimination too long. In this respect, it is interesting 
that discrimination law in the US developed in the reverse order, focusing fi rst on race, 
which the US Supreme Court considered to be a suspect category, classifi cations based 
on which should be placed under strict scrutiny (see United States v. Carolene Products Co 
(1938) 304 US 144 and Korematsu v. United States (1944) 323 US 214). Only in the 1970s 
did the US Supreme Court recognise the existence of a history of prejudice against women, 
although it did not regard classifi cations based on gender as suspect and used a less inten-
sive level of scrutiny (which was reformulated in the 1990s).
14  To which all EU Member States are signatories.
15  E Sebok, ‘The Hunt for Race Discrimination in the European Court’ (2002) EUMAP: EU 
Monitoring and Advocacy Program Online Journal. The ECHR and the Future of Human 
Rights in Europe <http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2002/may02/racediscreu-
court> accessed 15 April 2008. 
16  Nachova and others v Bulgaria (App nos 43577/98 and 43579/98) ECHR 6 July 2005.
17  For the pre-Nachova case law, see Chapman v. the United Kingdom (App no 27238/95) 
[GC] ECHR 18 January 2001; Beard v. the United Kingdom (App no 24882/94) [GC] ECHR 
18 January 2001; Coster v the United Kingdom (App no 24876/94) [GC] ECHR 18 January 
2001; Jane Smith v the United Kingdom (App no 25154/94) [GC] ECHR 18 January 2001; 
Lee v the United Kingdom (App no 25289/94) [GC] ECHR 18 January 2001; Connors v the 
United Kingdom (App no 66746/01) ECHR (1st sect) 27 May 2004.
18  D H and others v the Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) [GC] ECHR 13 November 2007.
19  It entered into force on 1 April 2005, but has so far not been widely ratifi ed (for instance, 
Croatia has ratifi ed it, but the UK, a pioneer of equality legislation, has not).
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Another part of the answer might be that as combating sex discrimi-
nation in EC law also had an economic rationale of preventing competi-
tive distortions in the market, and as women made up a larger part of the 
workforce than potential victims of racial discrimination, a choice was 
made to concentrate on sex equality. However, there is little logic to this 
argument, since no choice between prohibiting race or sex discrimination 
was necessary.  The same logic of preventing market distortions applies 
to the prohibition of racial discrimination; moreover, this argument is 
now being used with respect to discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin.20
Yet another part of the answer might be that combating sex discrimi-
nation in EC law also served a political goal, as ‘sex equality provided 
a relatively innocuous and even high-sounding platform, by which the 
Community could demonstrate its commitment to social progress.’21 Con-
versely, prohibiting racial discrimination was more sensitive, or, popu-
larly, there was less political will on the part of the Member States to deal 
with it at the Community level. The European Parliament22 had requested 
time after time that the Council of Ministers enact legislation prohibiting 
racial discrimination, accompanied by persistent lobbying by the Start-
ing Line Group23 over many years, but the Council was very reluctant,24 
reserving action only to soft law measures. In this reluctance to deal with 
racial discrimination at Community level probably lies an important part 
of the answer to the question of the late entry of the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in EC law.
As to why power was fi nally given to the Community to combat dis-
crimination based on grounds of racial or ethnic origin and why the Ra-
cial Equality Directive was adopted in 2000, literature25 most often turns 
20  See recital 8 in the Preamble of the Directive citing the Employment Guidelines 2000 and 
recital 9 and the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-54/07 Centrum 
voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV, pending, points 
14  and 18.
21  Barnard (n 12) 298; also see Ellis, EU Anti-discrimination Law (OUP, Oxford, 2005). 
22  The European Parliament had been active in the fi ght against racism since the mid-80s, 
commissioning the Evrigenis report on the rise of racism and fascism in 1984. 
23  See J Niessen and I Chopin, ‘The Starting Line and the Racial Equality Directive’ in J 
Niessen and I Chopin (eds), The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a 
Diverse Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2004). 
24  European Parliament, European Union Anti-Discrimination Policy: From Equal Oppor-
tunities Between Women and Men to Combating Racism, Directorate-General for Research 
Working document, LIBE 102 EN <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/
libe/102/text1_en.htm>. 
25  J Niessen and I Chopin, ‘Introduction’ in J Niessen and I Chopin (eds), The Development 
of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Lei-
den 2004). See also M Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (OUP, Oxford 
Studies in European Law 2002).
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to the surge of racism, including racial and ethnic discrimination, which 
had fl ooded Europe in the 1990s. Although racial discrimination existed 
in Europe before the 1990s, racial and ethnic discrimination ‘resurfaced 
at a time when European societies were becoming increasingly diverse as 
a result of continuous intra and extra European migration.’26 
This rise in racial discrimination and racially motivated violence 
showed certain commonalities across the Member States, demonstrat-
ing the need for a European answer. The then 32 member states of the 
Council of Europe had at the Vienna Summit in 1993 adopted the Vienna 
Declaration, a declaration and plan for action on combating racism, xen-
ophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance, and created the European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). The European Council 
did not have the power to act, so in 1993 in Copenhagen it could only 
call for the eradication of racism, while in 1994 at the European Council 
Summit in Corfu the EU Consultative Commission on Racism and Xeno-
phobia was created. 
The real Community answer became possible after the Heads of State 
and Government agreed to change the EC Treaty in June 1997 in Amster-
dam by adopting Article 13 EC, an empowering provision that enables the 
Community to take action.27 Soon after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1999, a three-part strategy for the fi ght against dis-
crimination was adopted.28The Community answer to the growing rise in 
racial discrimination was the Racial Equality Directive, ensuring a com-
mon high level of protection from discrimination, which could not be suf-
fi ciently achieved by the Member States acting on their own.29 
2.2. The Directive’s purpose
From this account, some conclusions on the purpose of the Racial 
Equality Directive or the purpose of its adoption can be construed. The 
purpose of anti-discrimination legislation in general is to give protection 
and redress to individuals who have been discriminated against, to re-
26  Niessen and Chopin (n 25).
27  Article 13 of the EC Treaty states: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’
28  The strategy to combat discrimination included Directive 2000/43/EC, Directive 
2000/78/EC and, through Decision 2000/750/EC, the Community Action Programme 
2001-2006 to combat discrimination on all Article 13 grounds except sex (the area of anti-
discrimination is now covered by the PROGRESS Programme 2007-2013).
29  Recital 28 of preamble of the Racial Equality Directive, satisfying the subsidiarity prin-
ciple as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty.
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duce prejudice by discouraging discriminatory behaviour, to reinforce 
other measures, and to support people involved in the struggle against 
discrimination.30 
Aside from these more general purposes, the Racial Equality Direc-
tive had some additional roles and is founded on and legitimated by a 
number of values. Firstly, referring back to what has been said about the 
perception of racial discrimination as a human rights issue, one purpose 
of adopting the Directive was to show that within the Union fundamental 
human rights now play an important role.31 This is exemplifi ed by recital 
2 of the Preamble of the Directive, which invokes Article 6 TEU, by which 
the Union is founded, among other things, on the principle of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also recital 3 of the 
Preamble, which invokes key instruments of international law related to 
discrimination.32 Secondly, referring back to the economic rationale, it 
is recognised in recital 9 of the Preamble that discrimination based on 
racial and ethnic origin may undermine the attainment of a high level of 
employment, also invoking the Employment Guidelines 2000 in recital 8 
of the Preamble. Thus, there seems to be a convergence of labour market 
justifi cations and human rights justifi cations for the prohibition of dis-
crimination.33 
Finally and most importantly, referring back to the political dimen-
sion, the adoption of the Directive sent a number of signifi cant political 
messages. As stressed by many authors,34 one of the reasons behind the 
swift adoption of the Directive was the situation in Austria, where in 2000 
Jorg Haider’s rightwing party entered the coalition government. In that 
state of affairs, the other Member States did not want to be seen as op-
posing the adoption of the new Directive combating racial discrimination, 
sending a strong political message by its quick adoption, both internally 
and externally. Another foreign policy element was achieved by adopting 
the Directive prior to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Dis-
crimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Johannesburg 
in 2001.35 Finally, a message was sent in the context of enlargement to 
30  E Howard, ‘The EU Race Directive: Its Symbolic Value - Its Only Value?’ (2004) 6 Inter-
national Journal of Discrimination and the Law 143.
31  On this topic, see P Alston, The EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999).
32  This has led McInerney to conclude ‘…one of the fi rst measures to be based explicitly on 
humanistic values, it heralded a promising new era for the protection of fundamental hu-
man rights under E.U. law.’ S McInerney, ‘Legal Protection Against Discrimination Based 
on Racial and Ethnic Origin Under European Union Law - Necessary But Not Suffi cient?’ 
(2004) 6 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 8
33  S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP, Oxford 2002) 25.
34  For instance: Bell (n 25) 180; E Howard (n 30) 148. 
35  S McInerney (n 32). 
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the future Member States on the Europe’s East, who had to transpose the 
Directives before acceding to the Union.
2.3. Main features of the Racial Equality Directive 
The 19 article-long Directive 2000/43/EC has been called ‘a mile-
stone in the fi ght against racism in Europe,’36 ‘a decidedly progressive 
development’ which ‘heralded a promising new era’37 and ‘a major step 
forward in the fi ght against racial discrimination across the EU.’38 It es-
tablishes minimum requirements, so Member States may introduce or 
maintain existing provisions that are more favourable to the principle of 
equal treatment. Furthermore, its implementation should not constitute 
grounds for a reduction in the level of protection from discrimination al-
ready afforded.39
It prohibits four types of discrimination: direct discrimination, indi-
rect discrimination, harassment and the instruction to discriminate, of 
which it explicitly defi nes direct and indirect discrimination and harass-
ment. Direct discrimination occurs if one person is treated less favourably 
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, 
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.40 Indirect discrimination occurs 
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared 
with other persons. This is so unless the provision, criterion or practice 
in question is objectively justifi ed by a legitimate aim and the means 
of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.41 Harassment is 
defi ned as unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin with the 
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.42
36  European Network against Racism (ENAR), Response of the European Network against 
Racism (ENAR) ‘Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000/43/EC: Five year report on the applica-
tion of the Directive - Overview of ENAR’s initial assessment’ (October 2005).
37  S McInerney, ‘Legal Protection Against Discrimination Based on Racial and Ethnic Ori-
gin Under European Union Law – Necessary But Not Suffi cient?’ (2004) 6 International 
Journal of Discrimination and the Law 8. 
38  Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Brussels, 30 October 2006 COM(2006) 643 
fi nal. 
39  Art 6 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
40  Art 2.2 (a) of Directive 2000/43/EC.
41  Art 2.2 (b) of Directive 2000/43/EC.
42  Art 2.3 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
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The Racial Equality Directive applies to all persons, in both the pri-
vate and the public sector, in relation to the labour market, including ac-
cess to employment, access to training, employment and working condi-
tions as well as membership and involvement in organisations of workers 
and employers. Unlike the Employment Equality Directive, its material 
scope goes beyond the labour market to cover social protection includ-
ing social security and healthcare, social advantages, education and ac-
cess to goods and services, including housing.43 It provides for certain 
exceptions: genuine occupational requirements and positive action.44 A 
difference in treatment will not constitute discrimination in cases where 
this difference in treatment constitutes a genuine occupational require-
ment.45 The Directive neither requires positive action to be maintained or 
adopted, nor prevents such measures from being maintained or adopted 
in order to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or 
ethnic origin.46
The envisaged route of redress is through the right to make a com-
plaint through a judicial or administrative procedure, including concili-
ation procedures.47 The burden of proof is partially reversed, as once an 
alleged victim establishes facts from which it may be presumed that there 
has been discrimination, it is for the respondent to prove that discrimina-
tion has not occurred.48 Sanctions for those who have discriminated have 
to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.49 The Directives also prohib-
its victimisation, so Member States must put in place measures necessary 
to protect individuals from any adverse treatment as a reaction to a com-
plaint or involvement in the proceedings.50 The Directive calls for dissemi-
nation of information on its provisions,51 for social dialogue,52 and dia-
logue with non-governmental organisations53 to foster and promote equal 
treatment. Finally, it requires the establishment in each Member State of 
an equality body for the promotion of equal treatment, which should also 
provide independent assistance to victims of racial discrimination.54
43  Art 3 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
44  Although whether the provision on positive action constitutes an exception or a way of 
achieving the goal will depend on the view of equality used.
45  Art 4 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
46  Art 5 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
47  Art 7 of Directive 2000/43/EC. 
48  Art 8 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
49  Art 15 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
50  Art 9 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
51  Art 10 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
52  Art 11 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
53  Art 12 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
54  Art 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
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III. Analysis of the Racial Equality Directive’s limitations
This account of the entry of racial discrimination into EC law shows 
how unlikely it is that the Directive will be amended in the near future. 
Firstly, the pressure created by the situation in Austria is no longer 
present - the internal and external massage has been sent. Secondly, 
the new security agenda after September 11th created a different set of 
priorities, requiring some different messages to be sent both internally 
throughout the EU, as well as externally. Thirdly, since religion, disabili-
ty, age and sexual orientation are in a much worse position than racial or 
ethnic origin regarding their status in EC law, amending the Employment 
Equality Directive seems to be a priority for most actors in the equality 
fi eld, while the Racial Equality Directive sets the standard to which pro-
tection should be extended. 
Unsurprisingly, in 2006 the Commission issued a Communication on 
the application of the Directive,55 drawing attention to a number of issues 
relating to the transposition in Member States, stressing that additional 
efforts are needed to ensure effective implementation and enforcement 
at the national level. Although Article 17 of the Directive states that the 
report on the implementation of the Directive shall, if necessary, include 
proposals to revise and update the Directive, the Commission stated that 
it currently does not see a need to come forward with such proposals. 
There are, however, some limitations and ambiguities in the Directive 
that should be addressed, as should the current equality framework.
3.1. The meaning and scope of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ 
The fi rst issue that arose in this context was whether the word ‘race’ 
should be used at all in Community legislation. During the negotiations 
on the Directive,56 some Member States argued that not only the word 
‘race’, but also ‘racial origin’ should not be used, since using these words 
reinforces theories of the existence of separate human races, which im-
plies the superiority of some over others. On the other hand, some Mem-
ber States insisted that the words ‘race’ and ‘racial discrimination’ should 
be used, arguing that it was necessary to name the issue of ‘racial dis-
crimination’ in order to confront it. As a compromise, the ground was 
formulated as ‘racial or ethnic origin’, but recital 6 was added to the pre-
amble: ‘The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine 
the existence of separate human races. The use of the term “racial origin” 
55  Communication (n 38).
56  For an account of the negotiations, see A Tyson, ‘The Negotiation of the European Com-
munity Directive on Racial Discrimination’ in J Niessen and I Chopin (eds), The Develop-
ment of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, Leiden 2004).
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in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories.’ In line 
with their earlier position in their anti-discrimination legislation trans-
posing the Racial Equality Directive, some Member States have avoided 
using the term ‘race’. For instance, Finland uses the concept of ‘ethnic or 
national origin’ and Sweden uses ‘ethnic belonging’.57
The second obviously problematic issue is that the exact meaning 
of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ is rather unclear. The Racial Equality Directive 
prohibits racial discrimination by reference only to ‘racial or ethnic ori-
gin’, while there is no defi nition of the meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ 
in the Directive or in the Explanatory Memorandum. What attributes will, 
for the purposes of the Directive, be considered to be ‘racial or ethnic 
origin’? As Fredman argues, present-day racism is not just about colour, 
but also about culture. ‘The characterization of race as a social construct 
also makes clear that, as a target for racism, “race” encompasses a bun-
dle of personal and social attributes, including religion, culture, national-
ity and ethnicity.’58 It is therefore vital that the tools for combating racial 
discrimination can address different aspects of contemporary racism. 
One way the meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ could have been clari-
fi ed would have been by listing these attributes in the text of the Directive 
as separate but overlapping discrimination grounds distinctions based 
on which fall into the broad notion of racial discrimination. For instance, 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits discrimination based on 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, religion or belief and mem-
bership of a national minority, among others.59 By using this technique, 
other discrimination grounds recognised by international law, like colour, 
national origin, membership of a national minority, language, or culture, 
could have been included as grounds in the text of the Racial Equality Di-
rective to make it clear that the multifaceted concept of racial discrimina-
tion was fully covered. However, that would be more diffi cult to justify as 
acting within the competence given in Article 13 EC, which states that the 
Council may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on a 
limited number of grounds, one of them being racial or ethnic origin. An-
other possibility was to defi ne the term ‘racial or ethnic origin’ or to defi ne 
‘racial or ethnic discrimination’ using these concepts or attributes. This 
is the technique used by the United Nations’ International Convention 
57  M Bell, I Chopin and F Palmer, Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 
EU Member States Compared (Luxembourg, Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European 
Communities 2007).
58  S Fredman, ‘Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Rights to Equality’ in S Fred-
man (ed), Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (OUP, Oxford 2001) 11.
59  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art 21 (1) of the Charter states: ‘Any discrimina-
tion based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minor-
ity, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’
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on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination,60 which defi nes 
‘racial discrimination’ as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or prefer-
ence based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. By using 
this technique, the Council would be taking appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, so acting within its com-
petence, and there would be less uncertainty as to the scope and meaning 
of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ as a discrimination ground.
The advantage of the approach used in the Racial Equality Directive 
is it gives more fl exibility to national legislators and courts. It will, how-
ever, be up to the ECJ to crystallise what exactly ‘race or ethnic origin’ 
might encompass in the context of EC law. This will be especially relevant 
for Member States that have chosen to include just the grounds found 
in EC anti-discrimination directives in their national anti-discrimination 
legislation.61 One obvious suggestion for an interpretation of the meaning 
of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ by the ECJ would be to use the grounds listed in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights to inform the interpretation of the Di-
rective. In addition, the defi nition of ‘race’ found in ICERD could be used. 
All Members States of the EU have signed and ratifi ed this Convention, 
which means the Member States already have certain legal obligations in 
that respect. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has also 
used Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion to defi ne ‘race’,62 with all EU Members States also being members of 
the Council of Europe. While there is no legal obligation for the ECJ to take 
into account international human rights instruments when interpreting 
the Directive, it is worth noting that these instruments (one of them being 
ICERD) are already cited in recital 3 of the Directive’s preamble.
3.2. The relationship between ‘racial and ethnic origin’ and religion: 
a hierarchy of grounds 
A particularly diffi cult question of the meaning of ‘racial or ethnic 
origin’ is the specifi c question of the boundary between ethnic origin and 
60 ‘In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other fi eld of public life.’ ‘Article 1, International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all forms of Racial Discrimination’ (1966), Blackstone’s International Law Documents 
(2nd edn Blackstone Press Limited, London 1994) 121-130 (hereinafter ICERD).
61  For instance, the current draft of the Croatian Anti-discrimination Act, currently in par-
liamentary procedure, includes 18 discrimination grounds, among which racial or ethnic 
origin, colour and national origin/descent, in line with obligations stemming from public 
international law, namely the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.
62  Jersild v Denmark (App no 15890/89) [GC] ECHR 24 September 1994. 
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religion. In social anthropology, an ‘ethnic group’ is a population of hu-
mans whose members identify with each other, usually based on a pre-
sumed common genealogy or ancestry, whereas recognition by others as 
a separate ethnic group also contributes to defi ning it.63 Ethnic groups 
are commonly seen as sharing cultural, linguistic and/or religious traits. 
The European Court of Human Rights has also recently held that ‘eth-
nicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked by common 
nationality, tribal affi liation, religious faith, shared language, or cultural 
and traditional origins and background.’64 
Although anthropology acknowledges the linkage between religion 
and ethnicity, for purposes of EC law ethnic origin and religion have 
been separated. Unlike the aforementioned grounds (such as language), 
religion is expressly included as a ground of EC anti-discrimination law, 
but in a different directive from that covering racial or ethnic origin. What 
makes this separation especially problematic is that the Employment 
Equality Directive which covers discrimination on the basis of religion 
or belief has a much narrower scope than the Racial Equality Directive. 
Through this divergence in scope, a sort of hierarchy of grounds has been 
created. By prohibiting discrimination on the ground of racial or ethnic 
origin, but not discrimination on the ground of religion in areas like social 
advantages or access to goods and services, a message is being sent that 
discrimination on some grounds is less acceptable than on others.65 
This separation and hierarchy is also undesirable from the perspec-
tive of effectively combating racial or ethnic discrimination. According to 
current EC law, a person who is a Muslim from Pakistan is protected in 
the EU from discrimination in the provision of services when it comes 
to their Pakistani ethnic origin, but not when it comes to being Muslim. 
While there are of course non-Muslims from Pakistan who are being dis-
criminated against, in the case of persons who are Muslim, how easy 
will it be to distinguish whether they have been discriminated against on 
grounds of religion or ethnic origin? 
The boundary between the concepts of religion and ethnicity be-
comes signifi cant once legislation prohibits discrimination on one of the 
grounds in certain areas, while on the other it does not. Since the law 
assumes a clear separation between the two concepts, groups like Jews, 
Muslims, Rastafarians or Sikhs, for instance, have to be classifi ed as be-
ing either religious groups or ethnic groups. In addition, irrespective of 
their self-identifi cation as religious groups or ethnic groups, they have to 
63  A D Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell, Oxford 1986).
64  Timishev v Russia, (App no 55762/00 and 55974/00) [GC] ECHR 13 December 2005.
65  Unfortunately, this could be read as a message that in Europe in certain areas and as-
pects religious discrimination is somehow acceptable.
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claim ethnic group status in order to be protected from discrimination. 
Earlier UK case law on the Race Relations Act, where groups had to argue 
that they were ethnic groups in order to fall within the ambit of the Act 
(as religion was excluded), has provided plenty of examples of the dif-
fi culties that can be expected. In the UK, Sikhs66 and Jews67 were found 
to be ethnic groups and so protected from discrimination on the ground 
of ethnic origin, but Rastafarians68 and Muslims69 were not. Dutch case 
law has, on the other hand, recognised that in certain circumstances 
discrimination against Muslims can fall within the scope of racial dis-
crimination.70
As Fredman explains, ‘ethnicity is intimately bound up with reli-
gion.’71 The solution to avoid drawing boundaries for legal purposes be-
tween concepts which are intertwined is for EC law to adopt a coherent 
approach to equality, using a common legal standard of protection across 
all the discrimination grounds. The relationship between ethnic origin 
and religion would not be legally problematic if one of three solutions 
were adopted: fi rstly, one directive could include all the grounds, treating 
them equally, but allowing for specifi c exceptions when necessary; sec-
ondly, by amending the Racial Equality Directive, religion could be added 
to ‘racial or ethnic origin’; and thirdly, a new directive could be enacted or 
the existing directive 2000/78/EC amended in order to extend its mate-
rial scope to that of the Racial Equality Directive.72 
3.3. The Racial Equality Directive and (national) minorities 
Perhaps an even more complex question is that of the relationship 
between the concept of minority protection and non-discrimination in the 
context of the Racial Equality Directive. It has already been discussed 
that the exact meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ found in the Directive 
is unclear, including the extent to which it encompasses national origin. 
The meaning of the concept of ‘minority’ is unclear as well, since there is 
no generally accepted defi nition of this term. For instance, instruments 
66  Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 HL.
67  Seide v Gillettee Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427.
68  Dawkins v Department of Environment [1993] IRLR 284 CA.
69  J. H. Walker v Hussain [1996] IRLR 11 EAT.
70  (Dutch) Equal Treatment Commission, Opinion 1998/57.
71  Fredman (n 33) 70.
72  In my opinion, following the amendment to art 2 of the Racial Equality Directive sug-
gested by the European Parliament would not be enough: ‘Discrimination on the basis of 
racial or ethnic origin which is presented as a difference in treatment on the grounds of reli-
gion, conviction or nationality is deemed to be discrimination within the meaning of Article 
1.’ European Parliament Opinion, A-5-0136/2000 and E Howard, ‘The EU Race Directive: 
Time for a Change?’ (2007) 8 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 246.
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of the United Nations tend to use the concept ‘ethnic, religious or linguis-
tic’ minorities, while the Council of Europe and the OSCE tend to use 
the concept ‘national’ minorities.73 Moreover, while Article 13 EC enables 
combating racial or ethnic discrimination, there is no EC competence 
regarding minority protection.74
The conceptual relationship between minority protection and non-
discrimination can be explained through the construction of minority 
protection on two pillars. The fi rst concerns non-discrimination in combi-
nation with the human rights of relevance for minorities, and the second 
has to do with minority specifi c standards of protection and promotion 
related to the right to identity.75 Henrard poses the central question as to 
whether, in addition to the prohibition of discrimination, ‘special’ minor-
ity rights are also needed, which requires an assessment of the extent to 
which prohibition of discrimination caters for the specifi c needs of minor-
ities.76 In regard to minorities, it seems crucial to use a more substantive 
notion of equality, and therefore to recognise that differential treatment 
might be necessary to reach full equality in practice. However, the right 
to the preservation of minority identity, including language, culture and 
religion, is clearly out of the reach of current EC law.77 Given its focus 
on identity, as well as a more substantive view of equality for minorities 
in the EU, there is clearly added value in the Council of Europe’s Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities78. 
73  For instance, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a 
legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities in 
general, which makes it clear that this protection is an integral part of the protection of hu-
man rights, but an instrument of the Council of Europe.
74  As part of the process of accession, the Commission pays great attention to the politi-
cal criteria, part of which is human rights and the protection of minorities. In Croatia, for 
instance, all the past progress reports paid particular attention to the Serb minority and 
to the position of the Roma minority. However, after EU accession, the EU protection of 
minorities no longer lies within EC competence. The EU, however, focuses on minorities in 
terms of the European Employment Strategy and the Process of Social Inclusion. 
75 K Henrard, Equal Rights versus Special Rights? Minority Protection and Prohibition of Dis-
crimination (Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2007) 
14. See also F Benoit-Rohmer, The Minority Question in Europe: towards a coherent system of 
protection. of national minorities (International Institute for Democracy, Strasbourg 1996).
76  Henrard (n 75).
77  Within the EU toolbox, the most signifi cant and promising development in the area is 
the inclusion of the prohibition of discrimination based on membership of a national minor-
ity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights has also stressed that minority interests can be mainstreamed in, for 
example, broadcasting, the provision of services of general interest or regarding safeguards 
for suspects in criminal proceedings. See the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fun-
damental Rights, ‘Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 
2003’ 101–103.
78  Provided the relevant Member State has ratifi ed the Framework Convention, as about 
25%  have not.
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Perhaps a different way of asking the same question is to enquire 
to what extent the current special rights afforded to national minorities 
in Member States and future Member States are in line with the Racial 
Equality Directive. Once again, an interpretation by the ECJ will be need-
ed of the limits of acceptable positive action in relation to ‘racial or ethnic 
origin’, an issue that will be further discussed.
Regarding the relationship between the concept of minority protec-
tion and non-discrimination in the context of the Racial Equality Direc-
tive, it is especially interesting to consider that the picture of diversity is 
different throughout the EU. On one hand, there are the Member States 
where the population has over the last decades become diverse on ac-
count of migration, although to a differing degree.79 On the other hand, 
the picture of diversity is different for the EU10, whose minorities have 
mostly lived in the same territory for centuries. Therefore, though also an 
issue for the ‘old Member States’, discrimination of (national) minorities 
appears in a somewhat different context in the EU10 and in Romania 
and Bulgaria, as well as in the current candidate countries like Croatia.80 
While minority protection is relevant for all the Member States, for some 
Member States and future Member States that have not been destina-
tions of recent migration, effectively combating racial or ethnic discrimi-
nation in practice will mainly mean combating the discrimination of some 
of these long-standing minorities or national minorities. Here, the state-
ment that contemporary racism is not about colour, but about culture, 
will have particular signifi cance.
A part of the symbolic value of the Directive was to send a message 
to the future Member States that they will have to combat racial and eth-
nic discrimination when they accede to the EU. On the other hand, it is 
questionable whether issues like the interplay of the concept of national 
minorities within the national legislation81 of those states with the Ra-
cial Equality Directive were taken into account when the Racial Equality 
79  Some Member States, like the UK, France and the Netherlands, have taken in immi-
grants from their former colonies; some, like Germany, Austria, Sweden, but also to a 
degree Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg, have for years taken in ‘guest workers’, while 
others have only recently become destinations of immigration. See B Liegl, B Perching and 
B Weyss, Combating Religious and Ethnic Discrimination in Employment from the EU and 
International Perspective (2004) ENAR 4.
80  In Croatia, according to the 2001 census, 89.6% of people have declared themselves as 
Croatians, 7.5 % as members of one of the 22 recognised national minorities, 2% did not 
declare a national origin, while 0.5 declared themselves as “others” (with 0.2% declaring 
a ‘regional belonging’ and  0.4% unknown). S TataloviÊ, Nacionalne manjine u Hrvatskoj, 
(Stina, Split 2005) 23.
81  Croatia, for instance, has detailed and specifi c laws referred to above on national minori-
ties (the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, the Act on the Election of 
Members of Representative Bodies of Units of Local and Regional Self-government, the Act 
on the Use of the Languages and Scripts of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, 
and the Act on Education in the Languages and Scripts of National Minorities).
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Directive was being drafted. Some statements regarding the issue like ‘it 
is often unclear whether the concept of ethnic/national minority found 
within these laws will be relied upon when national courts interpret anti-
discrimination legislation’82 and ‘in a few Member States the redefi ning 
of members of national minorities may have an impact on equal treat-
ment, but it is too early to assess the impact fully in the context of the 
Directive’, as well as ‘the grounds and scope of protection can have key 
differences and accord a particular status to communities’83 show this 
relationship remains under explored. 
It has been noted that in the Europe’s East and Southeast, rela-
tionships among different ethnic groups have been heavily infl uenced 
by centuries of rival nationalisms within the former Turkish, Russian 
and Austro-Hungarian empires.84 The Southeast especially may pose new 
questions regarding non-discrimination of national minorities. Concern-
ing Croatia as a candidate country currently in the process of enacting 
its new anti-discrimination legislation transposing Directives 2000/43/
EC and 2000/78EC, as well as other candidate and potential candidate 
countries of Southeast Europe, relations between ethnic groups have had 
a specifi c tone. Unlike racial and ethnic discrimination in the majority of 
the EU, which at least in the mainstream of society has taken on more 
subtle guises in the past decades, ethnicity and membership of a na-
tional minority have played an important part in recent wars.  Brennan 
might be right in saying:
The entry of the accession countries into the legislative ambit of EU 
race discrimination law is likely to present an interesting and differ-
ent challenge to that which was probably envisaged by the authors 
of the Race Equality Directive.  Issues such as that of culture and 
language, the rights of national minorities, and the mesh of religion 
and ethnicity are likely to test the legal imagination.85 
3.4. Effectiveness of the Racial Equality Directive in dealing with 
discrimination against Roma 
When focusing on the implementation of the Racial Equality Direc-
tive in the Europe’s East and Southeast, another issue that often appears 
82  Bell, Chopin and Palmer (n 57).
83  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Application of Council Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 - Views of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia, Vienna, August 2005 <http://www.eumc.at/eumc/material/pub/discus-
sion/EUMC_Paper_art13_ impact_fi nal.pdf> accessed 14 April 2008.
84  A Dummet, ‘Implementing European Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Analysis’ in 
Niessen and Chopin (n 23) 237.
85  F Brennan, ‘EU Enlargement, the Race Equality Directive and the Internal Market’ in 
European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference 2005 (9th), 31 March—2 
April 2005, Austin, Texas <http://aei.pitt.edu/2981/> accessed 5 March 2008.
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is that of the specifi c situation of Roma.86 The focus on Roma in the con-
text of enlargement has led to the realisation that Roma have faced and 
face particularly grave discrimination all over the European Union. This 
warrants a specifi c examination of the adequacy of the current protection 
from racial or ethnic discrimination in EC law as it relates to the Roma 
community, namely whether the Racial Equality Directive is adequate for 
addressing discrimination against Roma. 
 There are several reasons why many recent EU, Council of Europe 
and other initiatives have focused on the discrimination of Roma and 
Romani rights. Mainly, looking at various indicators of social inclusion, 
Roma seem to be the worst off as a group in virtually all of the EU.87 
There is a signifi cant difference between the socio-economic situation 
of Roma and non-Roma throughout Europe. The fi elds where Roma are 
particularly prone to discrimination are housing, education, employment 
and healthcare. The situation is additionally aggravated by the fact that 
Roma often do not have personal documents, which creates a barrier to 
the enjoyment of most rights. Additionally, Roma have throughout his-
tory faced negative stereotypes, which the low level of interaction between 
Roma and non-Roma only perpetuates. Furthermore, after the recent en-
largements, the Roma have become the largest ethnic minority in the 
European Union. 
Regarding the effectiveness of the Racial Equality Directive in com-
bating discrimination of Roma, in the Communication on the application 
of Directive 2000/43/EC the Commission especially emphasised the suc-
cess the Directive has had in addressing discrimination faced by Roma: ‘In 
the majority of the EU 10, statistics showed the Roma as the group most 
represented in complaints.’88 It has also been noted that the number of 
cases taken up by Roma indicates that the Directive is being successfully 
used to challenge discrimination against this group. However, given the 
extent of discrimination Roma experience all over the EU, the fact that in 
some Member States more cases are taken up by Roma than other minor-
ity groups might not be an indication of success in tackling discrimina-
tion faced by Roma, as suggested in the Communication.89 According to 
a statement from April 2008 from the Fundamental Rights Agency, it has 
86  While respecting diversity within many different Romani groups and related communi-
ties, for reasons of brevity, hereinafter the term ‘Roma’ will be used to include persons 
describing themselves as Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Manouches, Sinti, as well as other 
terms.
87  See AG Robles, Final Report on the Human Rights Situation of the Roma, Sinti and 
Travellers in Europe, CommDH (2006)1; also Focus Consultancy Ltd, ERRC and ERIO, 
The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union (Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg 2004).
88  Communication (n 38) 4.
89  See ENAR (n 36).
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been recognised that: ‘We have put in place strong legislation to root out 
discrimination in the EU, but the promise of equal opportunity remains 
unfulfi lled for many Roma and Travellers in our societies.’90
With respect to possible amendments of the Racial Equality Direc-
tive or other initiatives, a question that seems to come up in particular is 
whether Roma are in some way different from other ethnic groups with 
respect to the discrimination they face. If so, this would have implications 
for changes to the current system in order to combat more effi ciently 
discrimination against Roma. The principal argument for this assertion 
is that unlike other groups Roma suffer segregation, particularly in the 
fi eld of education.91 Accordingly, there have been a number of propos-
als for the further development of legal instruments at EU level, which 
would be focused specifi cally on Roma and could be based on Article 13 
EC. Mainly, the European Union Network of Experts in Fundamental 
Rights has recommended the adoption of a ‘Directive specifi cally aimed 
at encouraging the integration of Roma’, based on the inappropriateness 
in several respects of Directive 2000/43/EC, which was not specifi cally 
aimed at achieving the integration of groups that have traditionally been 
excluded.92 However, after initial discussions in 2004, the matter now 
seems to lie dormant.
3.5. Nationality and the Racial Equality Directive
It has been noted that ‘the distinction between grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin covered by the Directive and nationality and national origin 
has led to some confusion.’93 According to Article 3 of the Directive re-
garding its scope, ‘this Directive shall apply to all persons’. Recital 3 of the 
Preamble also says that ‘protection against discrimination for all persons 
90 A Crickley, Chairperson of the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Management Board, in a 
statement ahead of International Roma Day (8 April 2008) <http://fra.europa.eu/fra/in-
dex.php> accessed 15 April 2008.
91  Secondly, a reality specifi c to Roma as a group is their statelessness, which not only 
makes them more vulnerable to discrimination, but also has implication for their culture, 
as unlike other ethnic groups there is no state that has as one of its tasks the preservation 
of Romani culture.
92  European Union Network of Experts in Fundamental Rights ‘Report on the Situation of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union for 2003’, dated January 2004, published on 
26 May 2004; other informal proposals have included a proposal for a ‘Desegregation Di-
rective’ covering the fi elds of education, housing and health, as well as the ‘Positive Action 
Directive’ which would bind EU Member States to undertaking positive action measures for 
minorities, which would  include a specifi c chapter on Roma, or otherwise make specifi c 
reference to Roma.
93 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Application of Council Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 - Views of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia, (Vienna 2005) http://www.eumc.at/eumc/material/pub/discussion/
EUMC_Paper_art13_impact_ fi nal.pdf> accessed 8 April 2008.
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constitutes a universal right’. However, during negotiations, upon the 
insistence of some Member States worried about the possible infl uence 
on their immigration system, recital 13 and Article 3, paragraph 2 were 
added. Recital 13 of the Preamble states: ‘This prohibition of discrimina-
tion should also apply to nationals of third countries’, but then goes on 
to say ‘but does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality’, 
also adding  ‘and is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry 
and residence of third country nationals and their access to employment 
and occupation.’ Finally, Article 3, paragraph 2 reiterates that the Direc-
tive does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is 
without prejudice to provisions governing the entry and residence of third 
country nationals and their access to employment and occupation, but 
also to this adds ‘stateless persons on the territory of Member States’, 
and ‘any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country 
nationals and steles persons concerned.’
Therefore, the Racial Equality Directive applies to all persons living 
in EU territory, irrespective of their nationality. It has especial relevance 
for third country nationals, who are frequently victims of discrimination. 
However, differences of treatment based on nationality as a discrimina-
tion ground are expressly excluded from the scope of the Directive. Na-
tionals of EU Member States are nonetheless protected from nationality 
discrimination through Article 12 EC. What this means, however, is that 
third country nationals are not protected from nationality discrimination. 
Much like the situations described earlier regarding the relationship of 
‘racial or ethnic origin’ and other grounds, here too it will be diffi cult to 
draw the boundary between discrimination on grounds of racial or eth-
nic origin and discrimination on grounds of nationality. For instance, a 
person of Albanian nationality who is discriminated against in Italy on 
grounds of ethnic origin (‘being Albanian’) is protected in the same way as 
Italian nationals, but the Directive does not apply if discrimination is on 
grounds of being an Albanian national (being Albanian). Since ‘victims of 
racial slurs and violence are usually identifi ed in terms of their national-
ity rather than racial identity (eg, Moroccan or Turkish workers)’94 one 
has to wonder how this distinction can be upheld.
Hepple makes a strong case in his critique of the Racial Equality 
Directive of the exclusion of nationality as a ground of discrimination. By 
fi rst warning of the distinction between immigration policy and the way 
individual migrants are treated, he ascertains that the ‘universality of 
human rights is undermined by being restricted to those who are nation-
94  McInerney (n 32) 14 quoting Curtin and Geurts, ‘Race Discrimination and the European 
Union’ (1996) 14 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 147-171.
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als of the EU states.’95 Regarding possible amendments, nationality could 
be included in the scope of the Racial Equality Directive as a specifi c 
ground or in the defi nition of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ or ‘racial or eth-
nic discrimination’, as was earlier discussed for other grounds related to 
racial discrimination, but not included in the anti-discrimination direc-
tives. A particularly useful suggestion seems to be that differential treat-
ment based on nationality could be considered as discrimination, unless 
it can be objectively justifi ed, in line with the General Recommendation 
on Discrimination Against Non-citizens, issued by the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the treaty body of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.96
3.6. Limits of positive action under the Directive 
A topic touched upon in earlier discussions of ‘special’ rights of mi-
norities that form part of minority concerns, as well as effectively combat-
ing discrimination faced by Roma, is the issue of positive action. Positive 
action is a controversial topic, further complicated by a variety of terms 
used in this context97 that do not clearly provide any demarcation. Article 
5 of the Racial Equality Directive does not provide clear guidance as to 
what measures will be allowed.  Since the ECJ has not yet interpreted 
what type of measures are allowed, one way to think about the approach 
the ECJ might adopt in its future case law regarding positive action with 
regards the Racial Equality Directive is in relation to the existing ap-
proach to positive action as a means of countering sex discrimination. 
There are three possibilities, although two are more likely than the 
other. Firstly, it might, based on the difference in text,98 interpret the 
positive action provisions of the Racial Equality Directive more narrowly 
than in the case of gender. An indication in favour of this interpretation 
would also be the special provision concerning Northern Ireland in Direc-
tive 2000/78. As some authors have expressed it: ‘the demarcation line 
will be drawn when it comes to quota regulations… I doubt that quota 
regulations would be regarded as legitimate when it comes to the “other” 
95  Hepple (n 2) 3-4.
96  Howard (n 72) 252.
97  The terms used include  ‘positive action’, ‘positive measures’, ‘preferential treatment’, 
‘reverse discrimination’, ‘quota system’, ‘affi rmative action’ in the US context, and ‘employ-
ment equity’ in the Canadian context.
98  The wording of the positive action provision regarding sex discrimination seems to be to 
some extent broader and more inclusive. According to the Equal Treatment Directive, Mem-
ber States are allowed to ‘maintain or adopt measures within the meaning of art 141(4) of 
the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women.’ These 
measures may provide for ‘specifi c advantages’ for the under-represented sex, aimed at 
making it easier ‘to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvan-
tages in professional careers.’ 
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grounds.’99 Secondly, the ECJ might adopt an integrated approach to all 
the grounds and start creating an integrated body of anti-discrimina-
tion case law, based on the standards created in gender-related positive 
action cases. This would mean that minor differences in positive action 
provisions would be ignored and that the Marshall formula100 would be 
applied across the board. Preferential treatment could then be imple-
mented in favour of a racial or ethnic minority, under certain conditions. 
Thirdly, there is the theoretical possibility that the approach to positive 
action under the Racial Equality Directive would be more geared towards 
preferential treatment than in the case of EC law on gender equality. This 
possibility is, however, highly unlikely, given the political sensitivities 
involved in questions of race or ethnicity.
A different way of thinking about the approach the ECJ might adopt 
in its future case law regarding positive action is to pose the question 
about how appropriate a role this is for the ECJ at all. Caruso101 argues 
that transplanting the approach used with gender to the new grounds 
of discrimination will be diffi cult. She points out that there needs to be 
sensitivity to the socio-economic and cultural context at the national lev-
el and recommends that the ECJ provides broad discretion for Member 
States. That would allow the Member States to modify positive action ac-
cording to the local context. This proposal becomes particularly interest-
ing when considered in light of the debates on the role of the non-binding 
guidelines at EU level. The Swedish case Abrahamsson and Anderson v 
Fogelqvist102 makes one wonder whether it should be the role of EC law 
and the ECJ to place a low ceiling on the measures and policies of pref-
erential treatment that the national system was able to agree upon. As 
well as rethinking an approach to positive action regarding gender equal-
ity, this is particularly interesting considering that the Racial Equality 
Directive establishes the minimum standard. This should mean that the 
Member States are allowed to go further in search of policies aimed at 
achieving equality. However, this is not so when the ECJ places the limit 
as to how far.103 As a possible amendment of the Directive, positive action 
99  Holzleithner (n 7).
100  After the heavily criticised Kalanke, in the 1997 Marschall case the ECJ decided that if 
women have the same qualifi cations as men they can receive preference for promotion in ar-
eas where they are underrepresented if the male candidate could point to alternative criteria 
of preference (the saving-clause), thereby drawing the line between preferential treatment 
legitimate in EC law from fi xed-quota systems. This formula was confi rmed in the Badeck 
decision. See Kalanke C-450/93 [1995] ECR I-3051; Marschall v Land Nordrhein Westfalen 
C-409/95 [1997] ECR I-6363; Badeck C-158/97 [2000] ECR I-1875.
101  HCD Caruso, ‘Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union After 
the New Equality Directives’ (2003) Harvard International Law Journal 331.
102  Case C-407/98 Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelqvist [2000] ECR I-5539.
103  As Caruso puts it: ‘This construct has the comforting fl avour of subsidiarity and the 
support of considerable acquis in the fi eld of gender equality. The problem with this con-
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could be made mandatory, as will be discussed more in relation to the 
equality model used in the context of enforcement and remedies, but the 
limits of acceptable positive action nevertheless remain a crucial issue.
3.7. Underlying view of equality 
Going back to the analysis of its purpose, the Directive proclaims 
in Article 1 that its purpose is to lay down a framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to 
putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment, 
while Article 5 begins with the formulation ‘with the view to ensuring 
full equality in practice.’ However, before analysing what view of equal-
ity underlies the Directive, some theoretical considerations are in order, 
as equality is not a straightforward term. One theory of conceptualising 
different notions of equality is the separation of formal equality and sub-
stantive equality, which is then subdivided into equality of opportunity 
and equality of results.104 One concept of equality is formal equality or 
equality of treatment, according to which justice requires consistency 
and, therefore, likes should be treated alike. It does not take into account 
the existing distribution of wealth and powers and is primarily concerned 
with individual rights, not group rights, and the concept of direct dis-
crimination. On the other side of the spectrum is the concept of equal-
ity of outcomes or results, which is focused on the existing inequality of 
the distribution of wealth and power and strives to improve the relative 
position of particular groups. It is associated with the concept of indirect 
discrimination and the group rights model. 
A particular model of equality adhered to by EC anti-discrimination 
law is equality of opportunity. It focuses on facilitating personal self-fulfi l-
ment by equalising opportunities. Fredman explains it as a race in which 
some athletes are put a little bit ahead of others, but they all still need 
to run in order to see who will come fi rst to the fi nish line.105 It stands 
somewhere in between the two aforementioned concepts of equality and 
is consistent with both of them. According to equality of opportunity, 
unequal treatment might be necessary to equalise the opportunities of 
all individuals, but once opportunities are equal, different choices and 
capacities might lead to inequality of results. More critically, however, 
it seems that since the concept of equality of opportunity works like a 
struct is that, as usual, the internal consistency of the fl oor imposes conceptual limits upon 
the height and shape of the ceiling. The two are so conceptually tied to each other that the 
States’ freedom to experiment with affi rmative group policies, graciously given them by EC 
legislators, is intrinsically curtailed by the ECJ’s equality review’ Caruso (n 101).
104  Fredman (n 33) and (n 58) 11; S Fredman, ‘Equality: A New Generation? (2001) 30 ILJ 
145
105  Fredman (n 33).
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compromise solution between formal and substantive equality, there is 
sometimes some confusion about what it is really trying to achieve in 
practice.
Looking at the provisions of the Directive, it appears to be the per-
fect example of the equality of opportunity model. Its title ‘implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between people irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin’ and the stated purpose ‘with a view to putting into effect 
in the Member States the principle of equal treatment’ show elements of 
formal equality. On the other hand, its provision on positive action allows 
specifi c measures to be maintained or adopted to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin ’with a view to ensur-
ing full equality in practice’, which points to a more substantive notion of 
equality. The process-based defi nition of direct discrimination is rather 
formalistic, but it includes a hypothetic comparator. The defi nition of 
indirect discrimination is more generous, while the defi nition of harass-
ment links equality to dignity as an underlying value, again moving away 
from the formal notions of equality. It appears that just like the concept 
of equality of opportunity itself, the concept of equality underlying the Di-
rective is situated between equality of treatment and a more substantive 
view of equality approaching equality of results.
3.8. The equality model used in relation to enforcement and 
remedies
McCrudden distinguishes between three models of equality in rela-
tion to enforcement and remedies.106 First is an ‘individual justice model’, 
focused on fairness for the individual, by, for example, granting a civil 
remedy to a single victim of discrimination which has succeeded in a 
court case.  The second is a ‘group justice model’, aiming to improve the 
position of a certain group, through, for example, class action and stra-
tegic public interest litigation or through pressure for change through 
public procurement. The third is the ‘participative model’, aiming for 
greater participation of disadvantaged groups through tools like equality 
mainstreaming and necessarily through the involvement of the groups in 
question. Analysing the Racial Equality Directive, McCrudden concludes 
its remedial model is mostly based on the ‘individual justice model’.
A more realistic proposal would be to strengthen the existing model, 
for instance by strengthening the equality bodies. Through an amend-
ment of the Directive, they should be made independent,107 as opposed 
106 See C McCrudden, ‘International and European Norms Regarding National Legal Rem-
edies for Racial Inequality’ in Fredman (n 58) 11.
107  In accordance with the Paris Principles.
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to just having to exercise their functions independently. An element of 
independence reviewed should also be how the equality body obtains its 
funding, as independent funding and spending are a great guarantee 
of independency. Furthermore, the equality bodies have to be well re-
sourced, both in terms of funds and expertly trained personnel in suf-
fi cient numbers. In addition, Article 7 of the Directive could be amended 
so that associations with a legitimate interest have the right to engage on 
behalf of the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/
or administrative procedure.108
A characteristic of anti-discrimination in general, and also of the Ra-
cial Equality Directive and the national legislation transposing it, is that 
very few cases are settled in court, because of the reluctance of victims 
for fear of further victimisation, but also the worry of bearing the costs 
of a long and expensive lawsuit with an uncertain outcome.109 A change 
could therefore be made in the model used in order to approach more 
what McCrudden calls the ‘group justice model’ and what Fredman calls 
‘4th generation equality’.110 Hepple, in urging a shift in models towards 4th 
generation equality notes: ‘The Race Directive is based on a British model 
of the 1970s rather than what is required in the 21st century in Europe in 
order to achieve racial equality.’111
This does not mean that granting a civil remedy to a single victim 
of discrimination which has succeeded in a court case would be aban-
doned, just that some new elements could be imported in EC law. For in-
stance, positive action could be made mandatory. Additionally, its limits 
could be made more fl exible, in accordance with the needs of the disad-
vantaged groups, given there is agreement on a particular action in the 
Member State. The positive duties of public bodies to promote equality 
could be added to the Racial Equality Directive, requiring a change in the 
general approach, not just in post festum justice for the parties involved. 
As Hepple argues ‘A positive duty to reduce the under-representation of 
disadvantaged groups is, in the long run, more effective than negative 
duties not to discriminate.’112 The Member States could also introduce 
systems of contract and subsidy compliance, and so condition contracts 
with good equality ‘track records’ of businesses. 
108  As opposed to the current wording of Article 7 by which associations with a legitimate 
interest ‘may engage on behalf or in support of the complainant, depending on the criteria 
laid down by national law’.
109  Communication (n 38).
110  See Fredman (n 33).
111  Hepple (n 2) 12.
112  Hepple (n 2) 14.
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IV. Conclusion 
Thomas Hammarberg,113 the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, includes among key human rights challenges in Europe 
today racism and xenophobia, the rights of migrants and discrimination 
against Roma people. The enactment of the Racial Equality Directive at 
EU level, as well as the subsequent amendment of existing legislation and 
the adoption of new anti-discrimination laws in Member States, doubt-
lessly represents a major step forward in tackling discrimination based 
on racial or ethnic origin. However, this article has argued there are some 
limitations and ambiguities in the Directive that should be addressed.
The exact meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ as a discrimination 
ground will remain unclear until the ECJ clarifi es which attributes will 
be included in the meaning of ‘racial or ethnic origin’, or elucidates the 
distinction based on which specifi c attributes will constitute ‘racial or 
ethnic discrimination’ for the purposes of the Directive. It will, however, 
be vital that a wider defi nition is adopted, inspired by the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and CERD, in order to enable the Directive to success-
fully address different aspects of contemporary racism. 
Racial discrimination in theory, but also in the reality of today’s Eu-
rope, is a multifaceted problem. ‘Race’, ethnicity, nationality, national 
origin, language and religion intertwine. Legislation in this fi eld should 
therefore attempt to fi nd a way to regulate complex realities without ar-
tifi cially compartmentalising interconnected concepts. A formal and nar-
row conception of racial discrimination, which denies the interplay of 
concepts like religion or nationality with racial or ethnic origin, is insuf-
fi cient as part of an effective tool to combat racial discrimination. For in-
stance, expressly excluding differences of treatment based on nationality 
from the scope of the Racial Equality Directive and thereby not protecting 
third country nationals from nationality discrimination is an example of 
such insuffi ciency of current EC anti-discrimination law.
The hierarchy of discrimination grounds has been identifi ed as a 
problematic feature of the current framework, with a signal being sent 
that among the Article 13 EC grounds some are more important than 
others. This article has argued that even though racial or ethnic origin 
currently sits at the top of the hierarchy of new grounds, this hierarchy 
is also undesirable from the perspective of effectively combating racial or 
ethnic discrimination. The separation of racial or ethnic origin and reli-
gion into two separate directives is artifi cial, while the divergence in the 
113  T Hammarberg, ‘No Place for Complacency about Human Rights’ (Presentation, Brus-
sels, October, 2007) <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1201099&Site=CommDH&Ba
ckColorInternet=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679> ac-
cessed 14 April 2008.
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material scope of the directives exacerbates the situation. A particularly 
unfortunate consequence is that in areas like the provision of goods and 
services, in order to be protected from discrimination, religious groups 
might have to claim ethnic group status, while the classifi cation of the 
group as a religious or ethnic minority becomes a matter of judicial deci-
sion-making.
Regarding the relationship between the concept of minority protec-
tion and non-discrimination, it has been concluded that using a sub-
stantive notion of equality is necessary, but for minority identity rights 
the Convention for Protection of National Minorities remains essential. It 
has also been recognised that while minority protection is relevant for all 
the Member States, for some Member States and future Member States 
that have not been destinations of recent migration, effectively combating 
racial or ethnic discrimination in practice will mainly mean combating 
discrimination against national minorities. It will be important to recog-
nise that belonging to a national minority is a status or attribute clearly 
covered by the scope of ‘racial or ethnic origin’. This will have particular 
signifi cance for South East European countries, current candidates and 
potential candidates for EU accession, given their recent history and the 
role ethnicity, but also national minority status, has played. With respect 
to Roma, also a national minority in some states, identity preservation 
(as the ‘second pillar’) is important, but much still remains to be done re-
garding the ‘fi rst pillar’ of non-discrimination, which might require some 
specifi c action.
There are limits to what law can do in the fi ght against discrimi-
nation, especially law signifying legal norms whose violation leads to a 
court decision that creates justice only for those involved. The possibili-
ties are greater if the law mandates awareness raising, social dialogue 
and dialogue with non-governmental organisations with a view to pro-
moting equality, as the Racial Equality Directive does. Finally, law could 
also require the mandatory adoption of positive action, and could put an 
emphasis on the positive duties of different duty bearers. However, the 
approach the ECJ might adopt in its future case law regarding positive 
action remains crucially important, also regarding the above-mentioned 
minority rights, as well as positive action measures for Roma.
One could argue that given the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality it is not reasonable to expect all of the above from Community 
legislation. The Racial Equality Directive only sets the minimum standard 
and it is for the Member States to go beyond it if they so wish. However, 
now that there is EC equality law dealing with six different discrimination 
grounds, at least from an idealistic perspective it should offer a compre-
hensive minimum standard that goes beyond the standards of public in-
ternational law that already oblige the EU Member States. Discrimination 
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is a complex problem that operates differently from ground to ground and 
within a single ground from Member State to Member State, from group 
to group. Consequently, it requires complex solutions, which should also 
be different from Member State to Member State, from context to context. 
However, in the 21st century Europe, the common minimum should be 
set high. This article has outlined some ambiguous aspects of the Racial 
Equality Directive and offered some direction on future interpretation, as 
well as some possible amendments, in an idealistic attempt to show how 
the European minimum line could be set at least slightly higher. 
